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Abstract. Epistemic Indefinites (EI), with an added ‘ignorance’ component not seen with ordinary
indefinites, are licensed in broadly two contexts. In one, there is ignorance of the witness of the
existential claim among a plurality of referents in the domain. In the other, the witness of the
existential claim can be identified, but there is ignorance about certain aspects of this witness. The
first context is analysed as domain widening of some sort (Alonso-Ovalle and Menendez-Benito
2003, et seq). The second context is analysed as domain shifting (Aloni & Port 2010), with two
identification methods at play, one required for knowledge (the ignorance component) and one used
for specifying of the EI. Available identification schemes are naming, description, & ostension. We
focus on the second context, and show that the Telugu EI eed-oo/evar-oo (which-DISJ/who-DISJ)
‘some-thing/body’ can be used even when the speaker has access to all 3 methods of identification,
which should not be possible going by the domain shifting account. We propose a solution along
the lines that if the speaker has recognized the person, evar-oo/eed-oo cannot be used. Similar
to the familiarity theory of definiteness with discourse referents (Karttunen 1976) and ‘file cards’
(Heim 1983), we formalise this notion using mental referents and mental files (Recanati 2013,
2016).
1 Introduction
An Epistemic Indefinite (EI) has an added ‘ignorance’ component that is not present with an ordi-
nary indefinite, as shown in (1)-(2).
(1) a. oka
one/a
pustakamu
book
kinda
down
paDindi
fell
‘A book fell down.’
Existential component: 9x.book(x).felldown(x)
b. eed-oo
which-DISJ
pustakamu
book
kinda
down
paDindi
fell
‘Some book fell down.’
Existential component: 9x.book(x).felldown(x)
Modal component: The speaker does not know which book fell down.
(2) a. uma
Uma
naa-ku
I-DAT
oka
one
pustakamu
book
iccindi
gave
‘Uma gave me a book.’
Existential component: 9x.book(x).give(Uma, x,me)
1We would like to thank the audience of TripleA 4, Gothenburg, 2017 for comments and discussion.
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b. uma
Uma
naa-ku
I-DAT
eed-oo
which-DISJ
pustakamu
book
iccindi
gave
‘Uma gave me some book.’
Existential component: 9x.book(x).give(Uma, x,me)
Modal component: The speaker does not know which book Uma gave.
The question that comes up in this context is what counts as ignorance. How much can you
know and still use eed-oo? What licenses some in English? When can you absolutely not use
eed-oo? What anti-licenses some? The other question is how to encode the ignorance. What is
the source? Is it pragmatic, an implicature, or is it conventionalized, part of the meaning, or is it
domain widening, or is it domain shifting?
EIs are common cross-linguistically. As Haspelmath (1997) notes, they involve a “(lack of)
knowledge of the speaker” and he also says that this phenomenon “has received very little attention
in the theoretical literature.” In fact, they were first noticed by Strawson (1974) who says “that the
choice of some rather than a embodies what might be called an acknowledgement or recognition
of the fact that the identification supplied, though perhaps the best the speaker can do, might be
regarded as inadequate to the circumstances of the case; and that the kind of identification which the
choice of some rather than a indicates or suggests inability to provide (though perhaps sometimes
accompanied by indifference to or unconcern about) may be either further kind-identification
or individual identification.” (Strawson 1974: 92). He illustrates with the example given in (3).
(3) Some V.I.P/cabinet minister/general has been shot.
Epistemic indefinites have been examined cross-linguistically in mostly Romance, Germanic and
Slavic languages: English singular some (Becker 1999; Farkas 2002; Weir 2012), German irgen-
dein (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Aloni 2007; Lauer 2010; Port 2010; Aloni and Port 2013,
Chierchia 2013), Spanish algu´n (Alonso-Ovalle & Mene´ndez-Benito 2003, 2008, 2010, 2011),
Greek kapjos (Giannakidou and Quer 2013), French quelque (Jayez and Tovena 2007, 2013),
Italian (un) qualche (Zamparelli 2007; Aloni and Port 2013; Chierchia 2013), Romanian vreun
(Farkas 2002, 2006, Fa˘la˘us¸ 2009, 2011, 2012, 2014), Russian -to series & -nibud series (Geist
2008), Czech -si indefinites (Simı´k 2016), Slovak vola- and si- series (Richtarcikova 2013), Sin-
hala wh-da & wh-hari (Slade 2011), and the Japanese wh- ka indeterminates (Sudo 2010; Kaneko
2011; Alonso-Ovalle and Shimoyama 2014). They differ from each other in the environments li-
censed –they are sensitive to different types of knowledge. Here we will examine the Telugu EI
eed-oo/evar-oo ‘what-DISJ/who-DISJ’ paired with singular NPs.
EIs vary in their properties. Some EIs don’t mind reinforcement, whereas others do. Some EIs
don’t mind cancellation, others do. Telugu eed-oo doesn’t like cancellation, as shown in (4).
(4) a. oka
one/a
pustakamu
book
kinda
down
paDindi.
fell
adi
that
naa
my
diary
diary
‘A book fell down. It is my diary.’
b. eed-oo
which-DISJ
pustakamu
book
kinda
down
paDindi.
fell
#adi
that
naa
my
diary
diary
‘Some book fell down. It is my diary.’
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Telugu eed-oo also doesn’t like being reinforced, as shown in (5).
(5) a. oka
one/a
pustakamu
book
kinda
down
paDindi.
fell
adi
that
eed-oo
which-DISJ
naa-ku
I-to
teliyadu
know-not
‘A book fell down. I don’t know which one it is.’
b. eed-oo
which-DISJ
pustakamu
book
kinda
down
paDindi.
fell
#adi
that
eed-oo
which-DISJ
naa-ku
I-to
teliyadu
know-not
‘Some book fell down. I don’t know which one it is.’
This is in line with the generalisation in the literature that the more ‘specialized’ the morphologi-
cally, the more pronounced the ignorance effect.
In this paper we first examine the proposals for explaining the ignorance component in the
literature, and show how they fail with the Telugu data in §2, before attempting a formalization of
our own proposal for the Telugu indefinites, in §3.
2 What is the Speaker ignorant of?
Epistemic indefinites are licensed in broadly two contexts. In one, there is ignorance of the witness
of the existential claim among a plurality of referents in the domain. In the other, the witness of
the existential claim can be identified, but there is ignorance about certain aspects of this witness.
2.1 Case 1: Multiple referents
The speaker doesn’t know who or what the witness of the existential claim is:
(6) a. Context: Speaker is sitting with 3 others on a sofa. When he/she bends down to tie
shoelaces, one of the others pulls his/her hair. The speaker doesn’t see who.
b. (mii-loo)
you-in
evar-oo
who-DISJ
naa
my
juTTu
hair
laageeru
pulled
‘Someone (among you) pulled my hair.’
This can be captured using von Fintel’s formulation for some (that he adapted from Dayal’s what-
ever) –variation of the individuals satisfying the existential claim across the speaker’s epistemic
worlds.
(7) a. LF: some (P) (Q)
b. 9w0, w00 2 Dw [{x : P (w0)(x)&Q(w0)(x)} 6={x : P (w00)(x)&Q(w00)(x)}] (Dw is the
set of worlds compatible with the speaker‘s evidence in w)
This is also captured in an implicature approach (Alonso-Ovalle and Mene´ndez-Benito (AO-MB)
2003, 2008, 2010, 2011a; Chierchia 2006, 2013; Fa˘la˘s¸ 2009, 2011a,b, 2014) by saying that the EI
is a domain widener: The domain of existential quantification is maximal. Domain widening is
costly. It signals that alternative, more specific, smaller domains are false, lead to false claims. We
can illustrate with an example: Let’s say the 3 others sitting on the sofa are A, B, C. Then we get
the implicatures and their exhaustification as shown in (8).
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(8) a. In all accessible worlds, Someone among A, B, C pulled the Speaker’s hair.
b. Alternatives/Competitors:
In all accessible worlds, Someone among A, B pulled the Speaker’s hair.
In all accessible worlds, Someone among A, C pulled the Speaker’s hair.
In all accessible worlds, Someone among C, B pulled the Speaker’s hair.
In all accessible worlds, Someone among A pulled the Speaker’s hair.
In all accessible worlds, Someone among B pulled the Speaker’s hair.
In all accessible worlds, Someone among C pulled the Speaker’s hair.
But suppose there is only partial variation, and not all the alternatives are live, as shown in (9b).
Here Uma does not know where Ravi is, but not all rooms are epistemic possibilities. This is not
total variation or ignorance, only partial variation or ignorance.
(9) a. Context: Ravi and Uma are playing hide-and-seek. Uma knows that Ravi is hiding in
the house and she knows that he is not in the bedrooms, but he could be in any of the
others:
b. Ravi
Ravi
eed-oo
which-DISJ
room-loo
room-in
unnaaDu.
is
‘Ravi is in some room.’
AO-MB model this partial variation scenario as an anti-singleton constraint, as shown in (10):
(10) a. JalgunK =  f. Phe,ti : |f(P)|   1 . Qhe,ti 9x[f(P)(x) & Q(x)]
b. Domain (P) = {bedroom, bathroom, kitchen, study, dining room, living room}
c. f(P) = {bathroom, kitchen, study, dining, living}
d. In all accessible worlds, Ravi is in a room in Bath, Kitchen, Study, Dining.
e. Alternatives/Competitors:
In all accessible worlds, Ravi is in a room in Bath.
In all accessible worlds, Ravi is in a room in Kitchen. Etc.
f. All the alternatives are False.
2.2 Case 2: Single referent
In these cases, the speaker can identify the witness of the existential claim, by ostension, for
example, as shown in (11a).
(11) a. Context: At the conference dinner, the speaker is pointing out to his/her friend a
delegate who has climbed onto the table and is singing:
b. A: evar-oo
who-DISJ
delegate
delegate
table
table
ekki
climbed
paaDutunnaaru
singing
A: ‘Some delegate is singing climbing onto the table.’
c. B: evaru? ‘who’ A (pointing): atanu ‘that person’
The use of a demonstrative, a rigid designator, picks out the same individual across the speaker’s
epistemic worlds. There is going to be no variation, the variation condition is not met, as shown in
(12). But evar-oo is good here. So this analysis won’t work.
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(12) 9w0, w00 2 Dw [{x : P (w0)(x)&Q(w0)(x)}={x : P (w00)(x)&Q(w00)(x)}]
Should the variation condition be scrapped? A Lewisian ontology could save the variation condi-
tion (AO&MB), as shown in (13a).
(13) a. Individuals exist in only one world (the real one). Cross-world identity is modelled
via counterpart relations. Counterpart relations are similarity relations. For x to be a
counterpart of y, x and y have to be substantially similar, along a certain dimension.
b. 9w0, w00 2 Dw [{x : P (w0)(x)&Q(w0)(x)}6⌘{x : P (w00)(x)&Q(w00)(x)}]
⌘ is the counterpart relation that the context demands.
For example, if ostension is the counterpart relation that is available, but if the context demands
naming as the counterpart relation, the EI can be used felicitously.
Aloni & Port (2010, 2013) base their analysis on such a contextually determined ‘identifica-
tion’ condition, implemented in a dynamic semantics framework: “On the one hand, the indefinite
is used specifically. Traditionally, this means that the speaker has someone in mind, that is, she can
identify the referent of the indefinite. On the other hand, the use of an EI conveys that the speaker
does not know who the referent is, that is, she cannot identify the referent of the indefinite.” (Aloni
& Port 2015 p.129). As they say “two identification methods are at play here: the speaker can
identify on one method (for example by description) but not on another (for example naming)”
and the “referents of EIs are typically identified via a method different from the one contextually
required for knowledge.” Finally, “the notion of a Contextual Cover-shift is the technical counter-
part of this intuition.” For example, the “typical situation in which EIs are used is one in which the
speaker can identify the referent by description, but not by name. Another quite typical situation
is one in which she can identify by name, but not by ostension.” This is shown in (14).
(14) a. I have to meet some professor. He is the Head-of-Dept. But I don’t know his name.
Speaker-can-identify! Description, Contextually-required! Naming
b. I have to meet some professor. His name is Noam Chomsky. But I don’t know what
he looks like.
Speaker-can-identify! Naming, Contextually-required! Ostension
c. Some professor is singing on the table. Over there in the corner.
Speaker-can-identify! Ostension, Contextually-required! Naming
German: Good; Italian: Bad
The contrast between German and Italian motivates their ranking, as shown in (15):
(15) a. Ostension   Naming   Description
b. In Romance, but not in Germanic, the identification method required for knowledge
must be higher in order than the identification method required for specific uses of
EIs
So if a referent is identified by ostension, then EIs should be infelicitous in Romance, but not
in Germanic.
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2.3 The problem of the Telugu EI
The properties we know about EIs are that the EI is relativized to an epistemic modal base which
always obeys variation (and uniformity on one dimension): either the speaker doesn’t know who
the witness is among many others –a plurality of potential referents; or the speaker knows the
witness by one method of identification, but not by some other(s). An analysis to cover both
properties would say that variation is caused by indeterminacy of the existential claim: variation
of individuals yields non-constant reference; and variation of properties that lead to individuation
which are less fine-grained than getting all the way down to the individual yield a single referent but
varying on some dimension. The identification schemes that are in play are Naming, Description,
and Ostension.
But these Identification Schemes fail for the Telugu EI. Consider the example shown in (16),
where the Speaker has access to all three methods of identification, and yet use the EI.
(16) a. Context: Speaker can read the name-tag (with name and affiliation) of the person
standing on the table and singing:
b. Ravi
Ravi
Sen,
Sen,
HoD,
HoD,
EFLU
EFLU
ani
said
zevar-oo
who-DISJ
professor
professor
table
table
ekki
climbed
paaDutunnaaDu
singing
‘Some Professor called Ravi Sen, HOD, EFLU, is singing on the table.’
How can the EI be used if Naming, Description, Ostension are all available to the Speaker?
On the other hand, there are context where the Speaker cannot use the EI eed-oo/evar-oo, even
if there is an Identification Scheme that the speaker does not have access to, as shown in (17).
(17) a. Context: Speaker sees his next-door neighbor (of whom he knows nothing, except
that he lives next door) slip and fall on the road:
b. #evar-oo
who-DISJ
jaari
slipped
paDDaaru
fell
‘Somebody slipped and fell.’
In the above context the Speaker is more ignorant of the witness to the existential claim than in the
previous context where the Speaker knew the name and description. So there is more variation,
more possible worlds compatible with the speaker’s epistemic state in the above example than in
the previous example. Yet the example is bad. No variation story can save this situation. If the
Speaker has recognized the person, he cannot use the EI. But what does ‘recognized’ mean? How
do we formalize it?
3 Mental referents
Our proposal is that the Identification Scheme at work here is familiarity. We formalize it in the
following way. We already know Discourse Referents, going back to Karttunen, and Heim (1983)
and the familiarity theory of definiteness: A definite is used to refer to something that is already
familiar at the current stage of the conversation. An indefinite is used to introduce a new referent.
Karttunen reformulates the familiarity theory using the notion of “discourse reference”. A definite
NP must pick an already familiar discourse referent, whereas an indefinite NP always introduces a
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new discourse referent. An NP may have a discourse referent even when it has no referent. Heim
(1983) identifies Karttunen’s discourse referents with “file cards”, as shown in (18).
(18) A woman was bitten by a dog. (b) She hit it. (c) It jumped over a fence
3.1 Recognitional files, Mental Referents, and Mental Files
In our analysis we will make use of Recanati’s Mental Files (2013, 2016): To have a singular
thought about an object, a subject must have a mental file that refers to the object. To have a mental
file, the subject must be acquainted with its referent. Acquaintance is a relation through which a
subject receives information from an object –An Epistemically Rewarding (ER) relation. Mental
files are typed by acquaintance relations. Each file-type M is associated with an acquaintance
relation RM such that the referent of a file-token m of type M is the unique object o to which the
subject stands in the RM relation. The referent of a mental file is the dominant source of, rather
than the object that best satisfies, the (mis)information contained in the file. Thus mental files have
a non-descriptive semantics and so they are the mental analogues of referring terms.
Most mental files exist only as long as the relation they exploit contextually holds —demon-
strative files: “ when a demonstrative mode of presentation comes out of existence because the
demonstrative relation on which it is based no longer holds, another relation comes to hold, in
virtue of which I remember the object.”: memory demonstrative file Through our memories of
the object, we can focus our attention on it even after the perceptual encounter has ended. The
memory demonstrative itself is converted into a recognitional demonstrative file when the object
is re-encountered. Multiple exposure to that object then creates and maintains in the subject a dis-
position to recognize that object, via a stable recognitional file. The relation to the object is now
‘familiarity’. Our claim is that recognitional file anti-licenses eed-oo.
The recognitional file doesn’t have to contain perceptual information (visual, auditory, etc), it
can just be some ‘handle’ on that entity/individual, as shown in (19):
(19) a. Context: You’ve been telling your mother about a new friend youmade at work/university,
called Ravi. She doesn’t know how this Ravi looks like or sounds like. Ravi calls you
at home and your mother answers. If she makes the connection with the recognitional
file she has opened for Ravi then,
nii-koosam
you-for
(#evar-oo)
who-DISJ
Ravi
Ravi
phone
phone
ceeseeDu
made
‘Ravi has phoned for you.’
b. Context: If she doesn’t make the connection to the recognitional file:
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nii-koosam
you-for
Ravi
Ravi
ani
said
evar-oo
who-DISJ
phone
phone
ceeseeDu
made
‘Somebody called Ravi has phoned for you.’
3.2 Recognitional files: Human vs. others
Both eed-oo & some are sensitive to whether the referent is human or not, as shown in (20).
(20) a. Some professor is dancing on the table.
b. ??Some monkey is dancing on the table.
Weir (2012) takes recourse to the ‘anti-singleton’ constraint of Alonso-Ovalle & Menendez-
Benito (2010) to explain the contrast in examples like those in (21) and (22).
(21) a. ??Some statue is in the middle of the square. [looking at it]
b. ??I saw some building on my way through the desert.
c. ??There’s some letter in my mailbox [looking at it]
(22) a. Somebody is in the middle of the square. [looking at the person]
b. I saw someone on a camel on my way through the desert.
c. There’s somebody in my room. [looking at the person]
Weir (2012) states that “A speaker uses some NPthing to signal that she could not, if presented
with the extension of NP, reliably differentiate the witness of the existential claim from everything
else in the extension of NP. A speaker says some NPsub kind to signal that she cannot restrict to
a singleton the set of subkinds within the extension of NP to which the witness of the existential
claim belongs.”
We can here ask the question, why do humans go down to the level of individuals, and non-
humans to the kind/sub-kind level? We suggest that it is because that’s how we cognitively ‘parse’
them and ‘store’ them. Humans go down to the level of individuals. Non-humans stop at the
sub-kind/species level, as illustrated in the examples in (refsoup.
(23) a. naa
my
soup-loo
soup-in
eed-oo
what-DISJ
purugu
insect
undi
is
‘There’s some insect in my soup.’
b. ??naa
my
soup-loo
soup-in
eed-oo
what-DISJ
ciima
ant
undi
is
Intended: ‘There’s some ant in my soup.’
c. naa
my
soup-loo
soup-in
(oka)
(one)
ciima
ant
undi
is
‘There’s an ant in my soup.’
d. swimming
swimming
pool-loo
pool-in
evar-oo
who-DISJ
unnaaru
is
‘There’s someone in the swimming pool.’
The individual vs. sub-kind difference that eed-oo is sensitive to tracks the individual vs. sub-kind
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difference in recognitional files for humans vs. non-humans. Some non-humans like books, dogs,
pets, can go down to the individual level. On the other hand some humans can stop at the sub-kind
level like policemen, watchmen, soldiers, etc (people in uniform).
3.2.1 Kind files
We can capture this difference by using the distinction of natural-kind concepts: A variety of
recognitional files whose content is not an individual object. We can then posit that humans have
individual recognitional files, whereas non-humans have natural-kind recognitional files
(24) a. (i) I saw a camel on the way here.
(ii) #I saw some camel on the way here.
b. (i) I saw a man on a unicycle on the way here.
(ii) I saw some man on a unicycle on the way here.
c. (i) There is some plant growing out of the wall of my room (Weir 2012).
(ii) I saw some appliance/gadget on the kitchen table this morning.
This is similar to the type vs. token distinction in Japanese (Alonso-Ovalle & Shimoyama
2014), where dore-ka is for tokens and nani-ka is for types.
3.3 Recognitional Files: Celebrities
But in certain contexts, like with heads-of-state and celebrities, eed-oo is anti-licensed even where
there does not seem to be a recognitional file, as shown in (25a).
(25) a. Context: You are watching a news channel. They are telecasting live from the UN.
Suddenly there are gun-shots and commotion. The ticker flashes that the President
of Peru has been shot. You say to your friend:
Peru
Peru
President-ni
President-ACC
shoot
shoot
ceeseeru
did
‘Peru’s President is shot.’
b. Context: You are watching a news channel. The news is about a shooting in a school.
America
America
school-loo
school-in
John
John
Smith
Smith
anee
said
evar-oo
who-disj
student-ni
student-acc
shoot
shoot
ceeseeru
did
‘Some student called John Smith in a school in America was shot.’
So does this mean that celebrities or V.I.Ps are more easily familiar than non-celebrities? It
could also be that the notion of familiarity with a celebrity is suitably calibrated to the distance
that celebrities keep from ordinary folk, or some relative metric like that. Another possibility is
that these are actually Kind recognitional files and not Individual recognitional files. It could also
be that we expect hearers also to be familiar with them, taking hearers into the computation of the
notion of familiarity.
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3.4 Some doesn’t care for recognitional files
English some can be used for an entity that the speaker has a recognitional file for, as shown in
(26).
(26) a. Ravi is someone that I know from childhood.
b. This curry is something I’ve eaten since childhood.
This is of course not possible with eed-oo/evar-oo, as shown in (27).
(27) #Ravi
Ravi
naa-ku
me-to
evar-oo
who-DISJ
baagaa
very-well
telisinavaaDu
known-guy
Intended: ‘Ravi is someone that I know very well.’
So eed-oo/evar-oo and some split ways here. While recognitional files anti-license eed-oo/evar-oo,
they don’t anti-license some.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we saw clear evidence for an Indentification Scheme beyond Naming, Description,
Ostension to capture the distribution of the Telugu EI eed-oo —Familiarity. We made an initial
attempt at grounding this identification scheme in the notion of mental recognitional files of var-
ious kinds, with humans being sensitive to Individual recognitional files and non-humans being
sensitive to Kind recognitional files.
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